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McClanahan: Indian Law - Tribal Sovereignty - Congress, Please Help Again - T

Casenotes
INDIAN LAW-TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY-Congress, Please Help
Again-The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Cannot Regulate
Hunting and Fishing Because the Non-Indian Interest
Controls. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. 2309 (1993).

Before 1988, both the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe' and the State

of South Dakota had successfully negotiated the issue of regulatory
authority over hunting and fishing activities on Cheyenne River Reservation lands, and had each enforced their respective game and fish
regulations.' However, a dispute arose between the State of South
Dakota and the Tribe regarding the 1988 deer season. 4 Consequently,
the Tribe announced that it would not honor state hunting licenses,
and that hunters within the reservation would need a tribal license to
avoid prosecution in tribal court.' South Dakota filed an action in
federal district court against the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe to enjoin
the Tribe from regulating non-Indian hunting and fishing on the taken
area and non-Indian fee land6 within the reservation.

1. This note uses the terms "Aboriginal," "Indian," "indigenous," "Native," and
"Tribe" interchangeably and with equal respect to the indigenous peoples, including the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.
2. Indian reservations are federally protected lands set aside for the residence and exclusive use and benefit of tribal Native Americans. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 34 (1982). Indian Country includes "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation
under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation .... . 18 U.S.C. § 1151
(1988).
3. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. 2309, 2314 (1993). The district court found that
Indians "deriveld] considerable income from the sale of special licenses." Brief for Respondents at 8,
Bourland (No. 91-2051); Joint Appendix 168-69 (No. 91-2051) [hereinafter Respondents' Brief].
4. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2314. The Tribe was dissatisfied with the State of South Dakota's ill
regard for the protection of Tribal bufalo and grazing stock on the reservation. Thus, in the absence of a
renewed state-tribal wildlife management agreement, the Tribe expressed its intent to enforce tribal hunting
and fishing regulations on the taken area. Respondents' Brief at 14, Bourland(No. 91-2051).
5. Bourand, 113 S.Ct. at 2314.
6. Id. To construct the Oahe dam and reservoir, the federal government took 104,420 acres
of the Tribe's reservation land and 18,000 acres of non-Indian fee land located within the reservation.
See infra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
7. State of South Dakota v. Bourland, 949 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1991). South Dakota named
Greg Bourland, Chairman of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and Dennis Rousseau, Director of the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Game, Fish, and Parks, as defendants. Id.
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The federal district court permanently enjoined the Tribe and its
members from regulating non-Indian hunting and fishing on the taken
land and non-Indian fee land. The court concluded that the Cheyenne
River Act did not disestablish the Missouri River boundary of the
Cheyenne River Reservation. 8 Nevertheless, relying on Montana v.
United States,9 the court found that section ten of the Cheyenne River
Act clearly abrogated the Tribe's right to exclusive use and possession
of the former trust lands.' 0 In turn, the court reasoned that the Tribe
also lost the power to regulate hunting and fishing."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part and remanded. 2 The
court of appeals reversed the district court's order permanently enjoining the Tribe from regulating hunting and fishing on the taken land
and remanded the case to the district court to consider the Tribe's
regulatory authority over the 18,000 acres of non-Indian fee land.' 3
In reaching its decision endorsing Tribal regulation, the court of
appeals found that Congress' reservation of mineral, grazing and
timber rights to the Tribe was evidence that the conveyance did not
include all interests in the land.' 4 Because the Tribe retained this significant bundle of property rights, the court found that Congress had
not abrogated the Tribe's regulatory power."5 It also found that the
policies behind the taking in question and the takings in Montana v.

8. Id. at 990.
9. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
10. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2314-15.
11. Id. Moreover, the court found that Congress did not expressly give the Tribe hunting and
fishing jurisdiction over nonmembers on the taken lands. Id. at 2315. The Supreme Court recognized
the court of appeal's decision vacating this finding because this issue was neither pled nor tried. Id. at
2315 n.6. The State did not raise this issue in its petition for certiorari. Id.
12. Bourland, 949 F.2d at 986. Bowman, Circuit Judge, affirmed the district court's decision
not to join either the Tribe or the United States as an indispensable party because the district court did
not abuse its discretion in doing so. Id. at 989. The court of appeals vacated the district court's decision dealing with tribal regulatory authority over nonmember Indians because this issue was neither
pled nor tried. The complaint was limited to jurisdiction over non-Indians. Id. at 990.
13. Id. at 995. Under the reasoning of Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)
and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989), the Tribe could not regulate hunting and fishing on the 18,000 acres previously held in
fee by non-Indians unless one of the Montana exceptions applied. Id. at 995. Therefore, the
appeals court remanded to the district court so it could again undertake a Montana analysis with
respect to the 18,000 acres (the district court originally analyzed the taken area as a whole). Id.
The court of appeals said it was conceivable that the district court could find that one of the
exceptions applies in light of its decision that the Tribe retained regulatory authority over the
other taken areas. Id. at 995 n.20.
14. Id. at 993.
15. Id.
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United States'6 and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation 7 were distinct. 8 The court of appeals noted that
Congress constructed the Oahe Dam for irrigation and flood control
purposes, not for settling non-Indians on the taken land. 9 The court
of appeals did not discover any clear evidence that Congress considered whether the tribe would retain regulatory authority over hunting
and fishing." Therefore, it decided that Congress did not abrogate the
Tribe's regulatory power over non-Indian hunting and fishing on the
taken lands. 2'
The United States Supreme Court did not agree with any of the
court of appeal's reasoning.22 Instead, the Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals and held that Congress had abrogated the Tribe's
power to regulate hunting and fishing.2 3 In addition, the Court decided
that the Tribe's inherent sovereignty did not authorize tribal regulation
of non-Indian hunting and fishing.24
This note will review the development of tribal sovereignty and
the important historical treaties, statutes, and events the Court considered in reaching its decision. Next, it will analyze the United States
Supreme Court's disregard and deviation from previously established
principles of inherent sovereignty and federal Indian policy. Finally,
this note will describe the Court's current analysis in determining the
validity of tribal regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians.

16. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
17. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). See infra notes 63-86 and accompanying text.
18. Bourland, 949 F.2d at 992 n. 16. Congress passed the Flood Control Act during a period
when the federal government encouraged tribal autonomy and self-government. Id. Conversely, the
court noted that the land taken in Montana v. United States was pursuant to the Allotment Acts,
which intended to destroy tribal self-government. Id.
19. Id. at 993 (citing Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 820 (8th Cir.
1983); ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 502 (1988) (stating that the purpose of the
Flood Control Act was to build the Oahe dam)).
20. Id. at 991 (citing United States v. Dion 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (Indians enjoy exclusive
treaty rights to hunt and fish on lands reserved to them, unless clearly relinquished by treaty or modified by Congress)). The court noted that neither the Flood Control Act, Public Law 870, nor the
Cheyenne River Act addressed the issue of Tribal jurisdiction within the taken area. Id. at 994.
21. Id. at 993-94.
22. South Dakota v. Bourland, 949 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 113
S.Ct. 51 (1992). Issues involving Indian law are often difficult to resolve because the Court must
conduct a particularized inquiry into present day and historical tribal, federal, state and private interests to determine the validity of tribal assertions of regulatory authority. See National Farmers Union
Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe. 471 U.S. 845 (1985); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.
136 (1980); United States v. State of Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1172-73 (1979); Brendale, 492 U.S.
at 447 (Justice Stevens recognized that the factual predicates in Indian law cases are complicated).
23. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2321.
24. Id. at 2320.
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BACKGROUND

Early in North American history, indigenous peoples lived on the
continent in self-governing political communities, 25 exercising sovereign authority over their territory. 26 The North American Indians'
exclusive sovereignty lasted only a short time. Colombus's discovery
of the "new world" sparked European infiltration, conquest, settlement and colonization; the eventual demise of sovereign power had
just begun.27

In three early United States Supreme Court decisions,2 8 Justice
John Marshall formed the fundamental principles that still describe, to
some extent,29 the relationship between the United States government
and Indian tribes."0 These cases first recognized the principle of inher25. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832). One commentator also said:
After the Europeans came and occupied the continent, driving the Natives into enclaves,
even these enclaves came under attack, because they were limited to Native people. But
they are political communities, founded on tradition and culture, not on race. These political communities are not vestigial: rather they are the repositories of Native hopes and ideals of self-government.
Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1311 (1993) (quoting THOMAS R. BERGER, A LONG AND TERRIBLE SHADOW: WHITE VALUES,

NATIVE RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS, 1492-1992, at 160-61 (1991) (illustrating the use of prior occupancy as justification for the recognition of Native American government)).
26. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 556-57 (1832); see also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe 455 U.S. 130, 160 (1982) (power to tax non-Indians is an essential attribute of Indian
sovereignty).
27. For an extensive and detailed recent history of Indian and United States relations see generally 1 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE
AMERICAN INDIANS (1984).

28. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823) (Indian tribes possessed right of occupancy
subject to defeasance); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (Indian tribes are a "domestic
dependent nations" under wardship of the federal government); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832) (state of Georgia had no sovereign power in Indian country). For a detailed discussion of the "Marshall Trilogy," see Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitnionalism, and
Interpretationin FederalIndian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993).
29. Frickey, supra note 28. Professor Frickey has recently proposed that reviving Chief Justice
Marshal's perspective of federal Indian law would develop a more coherent and sensitive method for
dealing with the underlying issues of federal Indian law. Id.
30. Federal Indian policy has undergone many changes and developments. Basically, Congress
has struggled between two conflicting themes: tribal self-government and assimilation of the reservations into existing state and local governments.
Initially, congressional policy promoted tribal self government, but this policy changed after
Congress prohibited treaty making in 1871. Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16
Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988)). Next, in 1887, Congress attempted to assimilate
Indians into mainstream society by enacting the General Allotment Act. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119,
§ 1,24 Stat. 388 (1885-1887) (codified as amended 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349,
354, 381 (1982)). This Act allotted parcels of tribal lands to Indians, but the lands not allotted were
opened for homesteading by non-Indians. Id.
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ent tribal sovereignty. 3'
The United States did not grant sovereign power to the Indian nations.32 Inherent sovereignty33 arose from the Indians' aboriginal and
independent status which pre-existed the United States.' A tribe's sovereign power also included a significant geographical component that allowed a tribe to govern all matters and persons within its territory. 35

After recognizing that the assimilation policy was unsuccessful, Congress passed legislation to promote tribal independence. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat.
984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1982)). In the late 1940's, Congress again changed its
policy regarding Indians by reversing the IRA's self-determination policy. Congress implemented a termination policy which attempted "to make the Indian's within the territorial limits of the United States subject
to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of
the United States, [and] to end their status as wards of the united States." H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953). See generally Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, 7he Evolution of the
Termination Policy, 5 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 139 (1977).
The "termination era" lasted a short time. By the 1960's Congress activated the current self-determination policy. The policy of Indian self-determination has been reaffirmed in: the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1988); the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988); the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 45, 450a-450n, 458, 458a-458e (1988); and
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988). See also Philip J. Smith, Indian Sovereignty and Self-Determination: Is a Moral Economy Possible? An Essay, 36 S.D. L. REV. 299 (1991).
31. See generally Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-65; United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 32324 (1978). Treaties and Congressional acts are the other main sources of Indian authority. Historically, treaties were the primal source of Indian authority. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 33-46 (1942). In 1871, Congress provided that the United States would no longer make
treaties with Indian tribes, but it still protected all rights under existing treaties. 25 U.S.C. § 71
(1988). This law had little practical effect because the United States, through statutes and executive
orders, continues to deal with Indian tribes in a similar manner. See generally Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975). Executive orders may also be a source of tribal authority. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 398d (1988); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).
32. The Constitution only mentions Indians three times. Article I authorizes Congress "[to]
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; In apportioning the House of Representatives, two parts of the Constitution expressly excepts "Indians not taxed. 'Id. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3; Id. amend. XIV, § 2; see generally
Robert Laurence, The Indian Commerce Clause, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 203 (1981).
33. The term sovereignty is difficult to define, and it may point to the power of an independent
state. Macklem, supra note 25, at 1346. Sovereignty may be defined as "the supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable power ... the self-sufficient source of political power, from which all specific political
powers are derived . . . ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).

34. Chief Justice Marshall established this principle:
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people,
divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the world having
institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws. It is difficult to
comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of the globe could have
rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands
they occupied; or that the discover of either by the other should give the discoverer rights
in the country discovered, which annulled the preexisting rights of its ancient predecessors.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 542-43.
35. Id. at 557. Chief Justice Marshall:
consider[ed] the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands
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More recent Court decisions have also recognized that Indian tribes possess attributes of sovereignty over their members and territory.36 Realistically, however, the geographical aspect of tribal sovereignty appears
hollow, 37 especially when non-Indians are involved. 38 The Court has used
the tribes' unique relationship with the United States to achieve this hollowness.
The Indians' incorporation into the United States and the protection
enjoyed thereunder have necessarily divested the tribe of some aspects of
their sovereignty.39 The tribes' status as "domestic dependent nations" is
primarily responsible for the implicit divesture of tribal sovereign authority. 4' Originally, tribes had been impliedly divested only of the power to

within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those
boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.
Id36. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
Justice Blackmun has stressed the geographic component of tribal sovereignty:
The Court has affirmed and reaffirmed that tribal sovereignty is in large part geographically determined. "Indian tribes," we have written, "are unique aggregations possessing
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory" We have held that
lands obtained under the allotment policy, which permitted non-Indians to purchase lands
located within reservations, remain part of those reservations unless Congress explicitly
provides to the contrary, and that tribal jurisdiction cannot be considered to vary between
fee lands and trust lands ....
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 457 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). See also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980) ("The Court has
repeatedly emphasized that there is a significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty").
37. The Court recently stated: "the platonic notions of Indian sovereignty that guided Chief
Justice Marshall have, over time, lost their independent sway." County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S.Ct. 683, 687 (1992) (county could impose ad
valorem tax on reservation land patented in fee pursuant to General Allotment Act but could not
impose excise tax on sales of such land). For a discussion of this case, see generally Christopher A.
Karns, Note, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation: State
Taxation as a Means of Diminishing the Tribal Land Base, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1213 (Spring 1993);
Deborah Jo Borrero, Note, They Never Kept But One Promise - County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S.Ct. 683 (1992), 67 WASH L. REV. 937 (1992).
38. Justice Johnson may have accurately predicted the current status of tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians when he said "the limitations upon their sovereignty amounts to the right of governing
every person within their limits except themselves." Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147
(1810). Justice Rehnquist quoted this statement to support the decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978).
39. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574. However, this has done little to limit powers over
tribal members. Merrion v. licarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 160 (1982).
40. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 555. Chief Justice Marshall defined the relationship as:
perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence. Though the Indians are
acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the
land they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our
government; yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic
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alienate their lands and the power to make treaties with foreign nations. 4 1
More recently, implicit divesture has occurred in circumstances involving
the relations between an Indian tribe and non-Indians.42 In 1978, the Supreme Court expanded the importance of the tribes' dependent status and
thereby laid the foundation for future limitations on tribal regulatory
authority over non-Indians.
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,4 3 the Court established that
Indian tribes do not have inherent sovereign power to prosecute nonIndians who violate tribal laws because exercising jurisdiction over nonIndians was inconsistent with the Tribe's status.' 4 Thus, the Court used
dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of
their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. See also Gary D. Meyers, Different Sides of the Same
Coin: A Comparative View of Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights in the United States and
Canada, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. 67, 89 (1991).

A more recent definition by the Supreme Court describes the relationship as: "an anomalous one and of complex character," for despite their partial assimilation into American culture, the tribes have retained "a semi-independent position . . . not as States, not as nations, not
as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the
Union or of the State within whose limits they resided." White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracket, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 173 (1973)); see also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S 375, 381-82 (1886).
41. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1980).
42. The dependent status of Indian tribes within United State's territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with the their freedom independently to determine their external relations. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65 (quoting and emphasizing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326). But compare Montana with Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153-54
(1980) ("tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the tribes' dependant status" unless "the
exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National Government").
Tribes may also lose sovereign authority pursuant to congressional action. Wheeler, 435
U.S. at 323. Congress' plenary power allows it to abrogate rights established by treaties or other
documents. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) ("central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the
field of Indian affairs") (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974); F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 207-208, nn. 2, 3 and 9-11 (1982)); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (Congress has plenary
power over relations between the United States and American Indian Nations); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 616 (1871) (abrogated treaty with Cherokee Nation). For a comprehensive
discussion of this topic see generally Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Source,
Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984); Karl J. Kramer, Comment, The Most Dangerous Branch: An Institutional Approach to Understanding the Role of the Judiciary in American
Indian JurisdictionalDeterminations, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 989 (1986).
43. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
44. Id. at 208. For a criticism of the Oliphant decision, see Robert D. Wilson-Hoss, Comment, Jurisdictionto Zone Indian Reservations, 53 WASH. L. REV. 677, 695-96 (1978); Russel Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
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the tribes' dependent status as a justification for divesting tribal sovereignty. Before Oliphant, Indian tribes retained all their inherent tribal power
unless an act of Congress or a treaty had specifically taken the power.'
The Court later expanded Oliphant to prevent tribal assertions of criminal
jurisdiction over Indians who were not members of that tribe,' but Congress expressly overruled that decision.'
Although Indian tribes may regulate their own members and members of other tribes, the Court has struggled with, and has often rejected,
tribal regulation of non-Indians. In the past, Indians have attempted to
regulate non-Indians in many areas such as taxation,' zoning, 9 health and
safety,"0 and hunting and fishing.5 By successfully applying the Oliphant
and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1978); Jeff Larson, Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe: A JurisdictionalQuagmire, 24 S.D. L. REV. 217 (1979); Curtis G. Berkey, Note, Indian Law-Indian Tribes Have No Inherent Authority to Exercise Criminal Jurisdictionover Non-Indians
28 CATH. U. L. REV. 663
Violating Tribal Criminal Laws within Reservation Boundaries.
(1979).
45. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959); see also FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 123 (1942). The Court expressly reaffirmed the existence of inherent tribal sovereignty two weeks after the Oliphant decision. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322
(1978) ("the powers of Indian tribes are, in general, 'inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which
have never been extinguished'") (quoting F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122
(1945)). Moreover, Indian tribes "possess attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory." Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
46. Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053 (1990).
47. Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 13-1
(Supp. 11 1990)).
Additional legislation has been proposed to rectify other questionable Supreme Court decisions. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (no violation
of free exercise of religion clause when Forest Service builds a road approaching sacred Indian burial
ground); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (no violation
of free exercise clause when an employee was denied unemployment benefits because employee was
terminated for using peyote). Proposed Amendments to American Indian Religious Freedom Act, S.
110, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-141,
107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993)). See generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro
v. Reina and the Legislation That Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S.
CAL L. REV. 1 (1993).

This type of congressional activity may indicate that the Court's deviations from established
principles of Indian law are responsible for the setbacks to Indian rights. See Philip P. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, PracticalReasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of FederalIndian Law, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 1137, 1238 (1990).
48. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (Tribe has inherent power to impose severance tax on non-Indian
mining activity); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980) (Indians' authority to tax is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which Tribe retains unless
divested by federal law or necessary implications of their dependent status); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194
U.S. 384 (1904).
49. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 408; Knight v. Shoshone and Arapaho Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900
(10th Cir. 1982); Santa Rosa Band v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cit. 1975); Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co. 425 P.2d 22, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1016 (1967).
50. Cardin v. De LaCruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982)
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decision to a civil context in Montana v. United States, 2 the Court initiated a confusing53 view toward tribal regulation of non-Indian activities.
The Montana Court54 held that the Crow Indian Tribe could not
regulate55 non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian fee land located
within its reservation boundaries.6 The Court dismissed the Crow Tribe's
argument that its inherent sovereignty sanctioned tribal regulation of nonIndian hunting and fishing. The Tribe had no inherent sovereign power
beyond that necessary to govern the Tribe and its internal relations."
Without express congressional delegation, the Tribe had no power to
regulate non-Indians58 since that power had no clear relationship to tribal
self-government or internal affairs.5 9 By establishing two exceptions to
these general propositions, the Court acknowledged that tribes retain some
power over nonmembers. First, if a non-Indian enters consensual relations
with the tribe such as a contract or lease, that individual becomes subject
to tribal regulation.' Second, a tribe may regulate non-Indian activities if
that activity threatens or effects the tribe's political integrity, economic
security, or health and welfare. 6 Thus, under Montana, a tribe can still

(Tribe retained inherent sovereign power to impose its building, health, and safety regulations on
grocery store business of non-Indian who owned land and store in fee).
51. Montana, 450 U.S. 544; see also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324
(1980) (concurrent state and tribal jurisdiction regarding the regulation of hunting and fishing would
threaten Congress' overriding objective of encouraging tribal self-government and economic development); Oregon Dep't of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985) (state can
regulate Indian hunting and fishing on lands ceded by the tribe where cession did not indicate an
intent to retain hunting and fishing rights).
52. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
53. Montana "added to the growing number of bewildering statements and principles" in the
area of tribal sovereignty. Curtis Berkey, Indian Nations Under Assault, 16 HUM. RTS. 18, 21-22
(1989-90).
54. Justice Stewart delivered the Court's opinion. Montana, 450 U.S. at 544.
55. The Crow Tribe adopted a resolution that prohibited all nonmember hunting and
fishing within reservation boundaries. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th
Cir. 1979).
56. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65. The Court found that the Fort Laramie treaty gave the Tribe
the right to exclude non-Indians, but that subsequent legislation-the Allotment Acts-divested the
Tribe of its regulatory powers. Id. at 559.
57. Id. at 564.
58. Id. at 564 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973); Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20; United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886); McClanahan,
411 U.S. at 171).
59. Id. at 565.
60. Id. at 565-66 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); Morris v. Hitchcock,
194 U.S. 384 (1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1973)).
61. Id. at 566 (citing Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976); Williams v. Lee 358
U.S. 217, 220 (1959); Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118, 128-29 (1906);
Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 273 (1898)).
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regulate non-Indian activities, even on non-Indian lands. Montana becomes an effective limitation on regulatory authority only if interpreted
according to Justice White's opinion in Brendale.62
The next restraint on tribal sovereignty and regulatory authority
came in 1989 when the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to apply
Montana's tribal welfare exception.63 In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
& Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,'4 the Court was asked to decide
whether the Yakima Indian Nation or Yakima County could zone nonIndian fee lands located within the Yakima Indian reservation.65 This
question arose after two non-Indian fee land holders, Brendale and
Wilkinson, objected to the Yakima Nation's zoning regulations.'
Brendale's land was located in a heavily forested area of the reservation
to which the tribe had denied entry since 1972.67 Conversely, Wilkinson's
property was located in an open area where non-Indians owned half the
land in fee and comprised 80 percent of the population." A divided Court
addressed the controversy in three different opinions.69
Justice Stevens announced the Court's judgment regarding
Brendale's closed portion of land. He concluded that the Tribe had authority to regulate non-Indian fee lands on the closed but not on the open
The Court determined that neither exception applied to the Crow Tribe. Id. at 566. However, some courts have upheld tribal power over non-Indians under the Montana test. See, e.g., Knight
v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982); Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671
F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1978).
62. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice White's interpretation of Montana in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989).
63. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
64. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
65. Id. at 413.
66. Both landowners wished to subdivide their respective properties for land development
purposes. Id. at 418. The proposed developments complied with the county zoning plan, but both
violated the tribal zoning ordinances. Id.
67. Id. at 415.
68. Id. at 446-47. The county provided extensive services to this portion of the reservation. Id.
at 445. The General Allotment Act of 1887 was primarily responsible for the divided nature of the
Yakima reservation. Id. at 436-37. See The General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1958).
Under the Act, non-Indians acquired large amounts of reservation land in fee. See also supra note 30.
69. A plurality of four justices held that the Tribe did not have authority to zone Wilkinson's
"open" land. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 414 (Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy joined Justice
White's plurality opinion). Justice Steven's opinion held that the Tribe had the authority to zone
Brendale's "closed" land. Id. at 423 (Justice O'Connor joined Justice Steven's opinion; Justices
Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan concurred with the result of Justice Steven's opinion regarding
Brendale's property.) Justice Blackmun dissented with respect to Justice White's opinion and concurred only in the result of Justice Stevens opinion allowing tribal zoning of Brendale's closed property. Id. at 448 (Joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan).
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areas of the reservation. 7° A close examination of the land ownership
patterns was necessary to figure out how those patterns affected the
Tribe's ability to determine the character of the land." In doing this,
Justice Stevens concentrated on whether the Yakima Nation had the power
to exclude non-Indians from both parcels.' Justice Stevens allowed the
Yakima Indian Nation to zone the closed area because the Tribe had
maintained the power to exclude nonmembers from entering most of the
area. 3 Conversely, the Tribe could not zone the open area that had become assimilated into the surrounding county. 4 Because the Tribe lost the
power to exclude non-Indians from the open parcels, it also lost the power to define the essential character of the open area through zoning.' 5
Justice White delivered an opinion that was conclusive only regarding Wilkinson's open land. He relied on Montana and denied tribal zoning on both the open and closed areas of the reservation.' In applying
and interpreting Montana, Justice White found relevant the word "may"
70. Id. at 446-47. Justice Stevens distinguished between the "open" and "closed" portions of
the reservation. The proposed use of the "open area" would not threaten the tribe's political integrity,
economic security or health and welfare. Id. at 444. However, the Court said that the Tribe had the
power to restrict the use of the closed areas of the reservation because the nonmember's planned
development would endanger economically important timber production and threaten cultural and
spiritual values of the unique and undeveloped character of the closed area. Id. at 443-44.
71. Id. at 444.
72. Id. at 441.
73. Id. Justice Stevens said this power came from the tribes inherent sovereignty and a treaty
which confirmed the power. Id. at 435. Justice Stevens also compared the Tribe's zoning power to an
equitable servitude. Id. at 442. He thought that tribal zoning created a equitable servitude that ran
with land regardless of how non-Indians acquired the land. Id. Thus, the Tribe's ability to control the
non-Indian fee land was derived from the tribe's reserved power to regulate the land use. Id. One
could argue that inherent sovereign power is a type of burden running with the land.
74. Id. at 444-45.
75. Id. at 444-46. The Tribe's purported failure to exclude non-Indians was actually the result
of inauspicious congressional policies. The General Allotment Act caused non-Indians to heavily settle
the reservation. Id. at 436-37. See also supra note 30.
76. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 433. Justice White also relied heavily on Wheeler. Id. at 426-29.
The Wheeler Court established the general rule that tribes retain sovereignty to the extent that is not
divested by treaty, statute, or by implication as necessary result of their dependant status. Wheeler,
435 U.S. at 324. The Court in Montana expanded this rule when it said that the "exercise of tribal
power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and cannot survive without express congressional
delegation." Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 (citations omitted).
Conversely, Justice Blackmun (and now Justice Sauter) endorse Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). Under Colville, a tribe's sovereignty is
implicitly divested only to the extent that it is inconsistent with the overriding interest of the national
government. Colville, 447 U.S. at 153. In Brendale, Justice White reasoned that Colville was consistent with Montana in that Colville involved the power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and
significantly involving a tribe or its members. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 426-27. Moreover, Justice
White noted that Montana cited Colville as an example of the sort of "consensual relationship" that
could support tribal authority of nonmembers. Id.
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in that tribes "may" retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over
non-Indian fee lands located within their reservation." Justice White's
interpretation indicated that a tribe's authority need not extend to all
conduct that threatens or directly effects the political integrity, economic
security or the health and welfare of the tribe. 78 Instead, the tribe's authority depends on the circumstances. 9 According to Justice White, the
impact on a tribe must be demonstrably serious and must imperil the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the
tribe.8 In this respect, Justice White narrowed Montana.
Justice Blackmun t attacked Justice White's opinion because, in his
view, Justice White reiterated Montana's faulty "general principle" that suggests the exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the tribe's
dependent status, and therefore cannot survive without express congressional
delegation.82 Justice Blackmun emphasized that Montana was only one of
many landmark cases regarding inherent tribal sovereignty and that it clashed
with 150 years of Indian-law jurisprudence.83 Moreover, Justice Blackmun
reasoned that the tribe could zone the reservation land pursuant to Montana's
second exception because the power to zone was paramount to the Tribe's
economic security, or health and welfare.85 Accordingly, Justice Blackmun
would have given the Yakima Nation exclusive authority to zone both the
open and closed parcels of non-Indian fee lands.86
77. Id. at 429.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 431. The Court in Montana did not say what particular level of impact was necessary before a tribe could regulate non-Indian activity. It only required that the activity threaten or
have a direct effect on the tribe's political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. In determining whether a reservation is "open or "closed,"
Justice Stevens said that it is "impossible to articulate precise rules" and that "the factual predicate to
these cases is itself complicated." Brendale, 492 U.S. at 447-48.
81. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented with regard to Justice White's opinion denying tribal zoning over both parcels and concurred only with the result of
Justice Steven's opinion that allowed tribal zoning of Brendale's closed parcel of land. Id. at 448.
82. Id. at 450 (Blackmun, J., dissenting ) (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
83. According to Justice Blackmun, the precedents before and after Montana establish the
proper "general principal" governing inherent tribal sovereignty: "[Tiribes retain their sovereign
powers over non-Indians on reservation lands unless the exercise of that sovereignty would be inconsistent with the 'overriding interests of the National Government.'" Id. at 450 (Blackmun, J., dissenting joined by Marshall and Brennan, J.J.) (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980)).
84. Id. at 466-68.
85. Id. at 458. Justice Blackmun also found that the sovereign power to control land use is
especially important to Indians because they have a unique historical and cultural connection to the
land. Id.
86. Id. at 465.
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In summary, although Chief Justice Marshall established that the Indian
tribes are dependent on the United States, the tribes still retained sovereign
power over their territory. More recent Supreme Court decisions have manipulated the tribes' dependent status to divest tribal sovereignty, especially the
geographic component of that power. In South Dakota v. Bourland,? the
Supreme Court applied the restrictive trends of Montana and Brendale to
prevent the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe from regulating non-Indian hunting
and fishing on reservation lands taken by the federal government for purposes
of constructing a darn. a
PRINCIPAL CASE

In South Dakota v. Bourland,"9 the United States Supreme Court considered whether the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe could regulate non-Indian
hunting and fishing on lands located within the Cheyenne River Reservation,
but acquired by the United States for constructing and operating the Oahe
Dam and Reservoir.' After analyzing the applicable statutes, treaties and
governing decisions, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The Court held that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe could not
regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on the Cheyenne River Reservation
because Congress, in the Flood Control and Cheyenne River Acts, had abrogated the Tribe's right to do so under the Fort Laramie Treaty.9" Justice
Blackmun dissented and advocated the tribe's inherent sovereignty, an argument rejected by the majority.' A brief summary of the historical events
preceding the dispute will illustrate the circumstances and facts the Court used
and considered in reaching its decision.
In 1868, the United States and the Sioux Nation entered the Fort
Laramie Treaty,93 which established the Great Sioux Reservation. 9 The origi87.
88.

113 S.Ct. 2309 (1993).
Id. Since the Brendale decision, Justices Thomas and Souter have replaced Justices

Brennan and Marshall, who previously supported Justice Blackmun's view of tribal sovereignty.
89. 113 S.Ct. 2309 (1993).
90. Id. at 2312. Thomas, J., delivered the Court's opinion, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and
White, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J., joined. Id.
91. Id. at 2315.
92. Justice Blackmun noted that the majority's analysis gave "barely a nod acknowledging that
the Tribe might retain such authority an aspect of its inherent sovereignty." Id. at 2321.
93. Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat. 635.
94. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2312 (citing 15 Stat. 635, 636). The United States held the
Cheyenne River Reservation land in trust, for the benefit of the Tribe, but the Sioux retained
"absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the land. Id. In addition, the tribe received
the privilege of hunting, fishing, or passing over any of the reservation lands. Bourland, 949
F.2d at 988.
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nal reservation enjoyed short existence, however, as westward-bound settlers
pressured Congress to extinguish substantial portions of the original Sioux
reservation land in 1889." 5 As a result, Congress divided the remaining territory into several different reservations, including the Cheyenne River Reservation." Unfortunately, natural disasters necessitated further reductions in the
Tribe's reservation lands. Congress enacted the Flood Control Act of 1944 in
response to severe flooding of the lower Missouri River Basin97 in1943 and
1944.98 Subsequent legislation authorized limited takings of Indian lands for
hydroelectric and flood control dams. 99 The Oahe Dam and Reservoir was
one of the largest of such projects.' °
To construct the Oahe Dam and Reservoir, Congress gave the Departments of the Army and Interior authority to negotiate contracts with the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe to obtain the land needed for the project.' t l Ultimately, the Tribe conveyed "all tribal, allotted, assigned, and inherited lands or

The Great Sioux Reservation originally occupied most of what is now South Dakota,
west of the Missouri River, and part of what is now North Dakota. The aboriginal territory of
the Sioux Nation included the Missouri River, its tributaries, and adjacent riparian lands.
Respondents' Brief at 20, Bourland (No. 91-2051). The Fort Laramie Treaty gave the Sioux
Nation "the following district of country .. . commencing on the east bank of the Missouri
River . . .thence along the low water mark on the east bank of the Missouri River," and then
west to include all of western South Dakota, up to the 104th meridian. See Fort Laramie Treaty
of 1868, 15 Stat. 635, Art. 2; Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 319 (1942).
95. Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888. See also FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 79 (1982). Congress had altered the government's previous goals of tribal selfsufficiency by enacting the General Allotment Act of 1887. ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat, 388 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1988)). This new policy allowed non-Indians to acquire reservation
land previously held in trust for Indians. Moreover, "[a]n avowed purpose of the allotment policy was
the ultimate destruction of tribal government." Montana, 450 U.S. at 559 n.9. See generally FREDERICK HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880-1920, (1984). See
also supra note 30.
96. Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888. The Cheyenne River Reservation lies in
northwestern South Dakota, with the Missouri River serving as its eastern border. Although Congress
significantly reduced reservation lands, the Act expressly preserved the Sioux's original rights under
the Fort Laramie Treaty "not in conflict" with the new statute. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2313 (citing
§ 19, 25 Stat. 896).
97. Historically, the Tribe suffered minimal flood damage because of its northern location. The
Oahe Dam and Reservoir was necessary to protect areas of Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, and Iowa,
all of which lie below the Oahe dam. H.R. REP. No. 1047. 81st Cong., 1st. Sess. 3 (1950).
98. Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887. This Act established a comprehensive
flood plan and gave the Army Chief of Engineers the responsibility of constructing dams along the
Missouri River to prevent future flood disasters. Other purposes included the development of "public
park and recreational facilities in reservoir areas" open to public use generally and subject to "such
rules and regulations as the Secretary of War may deem necessary." Bourland, 113 S.CI. at 2313
(citing § 4,58 Stat. 889-890).
99. For a discussion of these transactions see Lower Bnile Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 711
F.2d 809, 813 n.l (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984).
100. Bourtand, 113 S.Ct. at 2313 (citing Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887).
101. Id.at 2313 n.1 (citing Pub.L. No. 870, Ch. 1120, 64 Stat. 1093 (1950)).
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interests" in 104,420 acres of its land." 2 In exchange, the government gave
the Tribe $10,644,014. 103This4 sum was infinal and complete settlement of all
claims, rights, and demands.1
Despite the broad takings language, certain sections of the Cheyenne
River Act reserved many rights to the Tribe or tribal members.'0 5 The Tribe
retained mineral rights, grazing rights, continued occupation on the taken land
until closure of the dam's gates, and the right to cut and remove timber without charge." ° In addition, the Tribe received the right of free access to the
reservoir shoreline, including the right to hunt and fish,"t° subject, however,
to regulations 0 8 governing the corresponding use by other United States citizens." ° Once the Court identified this important framework, it considered

102. Id. at2313-14 (citing Cheyenne River Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 1191).
103. Id. at2314 n.2. The Tribe and its amici argued that right to regulate hunting and fishing
was not abrogated because the $10,644,014 appropriated in the Cheyenne River Act did not include
compensation for the Tribe's loss of licensing revenue. Id. at 2319. The Court rejected this argument
because the Act said that the appropriated funds were a final and complete settlement of all claims,
rights, and demands. Id. It would not conclude that the Act reserved to the Tribe the right to regulate
hunting and fishing, simply because the legislative history did not include an itemized amount for the
Tribe's loss of licensing revenue. Id.
104. More specifically, this amount compensated the Tribe for the loss of wildlife, the loss of
revenue from grazing permits, the costs of negotiating the agreement, the costs of "complete rehabilitation" of all resident members, and the restoration of tribal life. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2314 n.2.
(citing §§ 2,5,and 13, 68 Stat. 1191-1194).
The Flood Control Act alsorequired non-Indian fee owners to relinquish an additional
18,000 acres for the Oahe Dam and Reservoir Project. Id. at 2314. The record did not indicate how
non-Indians acquired these lands, Id. at 2314 n.3.
105. Although Congress significantly reduced reservation lands, the Cheyenne River Act expressly preserved the Sioux's original rights under the Fort Laramie Treaty "not in conflict" with the
new statute. Id. at 2312 (citing § 19, 25 Stat. 896).
106. Id. at 2314 (citing §§ 6, 7, 9, 10, 68 Stat. 1192-93).
107. The creation of an Indian reservation, by Congressional action, executive order, or treaty,
to hunt and fish on the reservation. Laurie Reynolds, Indian
ordinarily reserves the Indian's right
Hunting and Fishing Rights: The Role of Tribal Sovereignty and Preemption, 62 N.C. L. REV. 743,
747 (1984). Hunting and fishing are "normal incidents of Indian life." Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 391 U.S. 404, 405-06 (1968). See also Meyers, supra note 40, at 91.
108. Congress gave the Army Corps of Engineers primary regulatory authority over the water
project lands. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2320 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 460d; 36 C.F.R. § 327.1(a) (1992)).
The Corps had authority topromulgate regulations not inconsistent with treaties and Federal laws and
regulations concerning the rights of Indian nations. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2320 (citing 36 C.F.R.
§ 327. 1(f) (1992)). The applicable regulation provides that "all federal, state and local laws governing
these activities apply on project lands and waters, as regulated by authorized enforcement officials."
Id. (citing § 327.8, 327.26). The Tribe and the United States (as amicus curie) argued that the Army
corps regulations permitted the tribe to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing because it insisted that
"tribal" law was a subset of "local" law. Id. The majority believed that this argument was undeveloped. Id. at 2321. The Court reasoned that Congress had distinguished between local and tribal law
when it stated in another regulation that "the primary responsibility for determining zoning and land
use matters rests with state, local and tribal governments." Id. at n.16 (citing 33 C.F.R.
§ 320.4(j)(2)).
109. Id. at 2313 (citing Cheyenne River Act of Sept. 3, 1954, 68 Stat. 1191, 1193).
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whether the Tribe possessed the power to regulate non-Indian hunting and
fishing on the taken land.
Justice Thomas began the majority's analysis by noting that Congress
possesses the power to abrogate Indians' treaty rights, although it must clearly
express its intent to do so."' After acknowledging these canons of construction, the Court relied on Montana v. United States.' and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of The Yakima Indian Nation"2 to determine the
existence of tribal regulatory authority, and whether Congress had subsequently abrogated this power.
To establish the Tribe's original right to regulate hunting and fishing,
the Court looked to the Fort Laramie Treaty and a parallel treaty in Montana."3 The Fort Laramie Treaty gave the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe the
implicit power to exclude non-Indians from the reservation and, therethrough,
the authority to control fishing and hunting on those lands. 11 4 Thus, the Tribe
originally possessed the right to regulate non-Indian use of the lands taken for
the Oahe Dam and Reservoir Project." 5 However, the majority quickly negated this right.
Focusing on the power to exclude and the lesser included power to
regulate, the Court applied the principle from Montana and Brendale that an
Indian tribe forfeits any right of exclusive use of tribal lands when it conveys
them to non-Indians." 6 Consequently, the Court found that the pre-existing
regulatory power over non-Indian use of the Cheyenne River Reservation had
been implicitly lost." 7 Because the Flood Control Act provided that all such

110. Id. at 2315-16 (citing Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13
(1968); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986)): see also infra note 181. In addition, Justice Thomas recognized that the Court liberally construes statutes in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit. Id. (citing County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation,
112 S.Ct. 683, 692 (1992)).
111. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
112. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). See supra notes 63-86 and accompanying text.
113. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2316. Both treaties gave the respective tribes "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation [of the land]." Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, 15 Stat. 649 (treaty with the
Crow); Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, 15 Stat. 635 (treaty with the Sioux); Montana, 450 U.S. at 55859 (Fort Laramie Treaty "arguably" gave Crow Tribe authority to regulate hunting and fishing on
reservation).
114. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2316 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 558-59).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2316. The nature of the Government's title is not exactly clear. The district court
characterized the taking as the transfer of fee ownership from the Tribe to the United States, Id. at
2314 n.4. Conversely, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals referred to the land as neither non-Indianowned fee land nor trust land. Bourland, 949 F.2d at 990. The Supreme Court assumed that the
United States held the 104,420 acres in fee because the nature of the Government's title in the taken
land was not relevant to its analysis. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2314 n.4. But see infra note 190.
117. Id. at 2316.
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projects would be open to the general public for recreational purposes,' 18 the
Court found that the "clear effect" of this broad opening eliminated the
Tribes's power to exclude non-Indians, and, therefore, the incidental regulatory jurisdiction originally enjoyed by the Tribe. 9
The majority asserted a secondary justification, derived from the
Cheyenne River Act, to abrogate the Tribe's original regulatory power
enjoyed under the Fort Laramie Treaty."' ° Because the compensation
given for the taken land was a final and complete settlement of all claims,
the Court found that the agreement embodied all of the Tribe's rights.' 2'
Congress could have expressly given the Tribe the more inclusive right to
regulate hunting and fishing, but it did not."2
Again observing the importance of the relationship between the
power to exclude and the incidental power to regulate, the majority displaced the Tribe's argument that it had never claimed the right to exclude

118. The term recreational purposes includes hunting and fishing. Id. at 2317.
119. Id. at 2316-17.
120. Id. at 2317. The Court stated: "if the Flood Control Act leaves any doubt whether the tribe
retains its original treaty right to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on lands taken for federal
water projects, the Cheyenne River Act extinguishes all such doubt." Id.
121. Id. at 2317 (citing 68 Stat. 1191). The Tribe and their amici asserted an argument based on
the compensation received for the taken lands. Id. at 2319. They argued that their right to regulate
hunting and fishing was not abrogated because the money received did not include compensation for
the Tribe's loss of licensing revenue and, thus, Congress breached its duty to fully compensate the
tribe for the rights taken. The Court rejected this argument and concluded that the absence of an
itemized amount disclosing compensation for lost licensing revenue did not result in a right to regulate hunting and fishing. Id.
122. The rights granted under section 10 of the Act "[stood] in contrast" to the expansive
right of "absolute and undisturbed use" the Tribe enjoyed under the Fort Laramie Treaty. Consequently, the Tribe did not enjoy the right to exclude and, thus, the right to regulate. Id.
Because the Tribe retained mineral, grazing, and timber rights under the Cheyenne
River Act, the court of appeals found that the conveyance was not a simple conveyance of all
interests in the land. Bourland, 949 F.2d at 993. Thus, the court of appeals concluded that
Congress had not abrogated the Tribe's preexisting regulatory authority. Id. at 994. The Supreme Court disagreed and stated that the explicit reservation of certain rights does not operate
as an implicit reservation of all former rights. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2318. To justify this
approach, the Court relied on United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (question was whether an Indian who takes an eagle on tribal land violates the Eagle Protection Act). In Dion, the
Court required "clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that
conflict by abrogating the treaty." Id. at 740.
The Court, in Dion, found an exemption in the statute "difficult to explain except as a
reflection of an understanding that the statute otherwise bans the taking of eagles by Indians."
Id. Similarly, in Bourland, the majority said it could not explain The Cheyenne River Act and
the Flood Control Act except as indications that Congress sought to divest the tribe of its exclusive use of the taken area. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2319. Thus, the Court said when Congress
reserves limited rights to a tribe, it arguably suggests that the Indians would otherwise be treated like the public at large. Id. Justice Blackmun believed that Dion stood for exactly the opposite conclusion. Id. at 2324 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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non-Indians. 23 Under Brendale, once a tribe loses the right to exclusive
use and occupation of its lands, it also loses the power to regulate. 2 4 In
summary, the Flood Control Act's broad opening of the lands for public
use and the Cheyenne River Act's limited grant of rights affirmatively
abrogated the Tribe's authority to regulate hunting and fishing on the
taken lands. Next, the majority compared the nature of the takings in
Montana and the present dispute.
Justice Thomas conceded that the conveyance of absolute fee title in
Montana differed from the conveyance in the instant dispute because the
Cheyenne River Act preserved certain rights to the Cheyenne River
Sioux." However, he rejected the court of appeals' analysis which
stressed the contrasting policies underlying the land taken in Montana
pursuant to the Allotment Act and the instant dispute. Justice Thomas
clarified Montana by emphasizing that the focus should be on the effect of
the alienation, not the purpose. 26 The Tribe's loss of rights attributed to
the Cheyenne River Act was enough to divest the Tribe's regulatory
power over hunting and fishing. 27
Justice Blackmun began his dissent by recognizing the majority's
inattention to the Tribe's inherent sovereignty.128 He stressed that inherent
sovereignty is a "fundamental principle of federal Indian law" that has
never been extinguished. 129 He rejected the majority's position that Congress divested the Tribe of its inherent sovereignty. Since the majority did
not identify any "overriding federal interest," it could not justify implicit

123. Id. at 2317. At oral argument, the Tribe contended that it did not want to exclude nonIndians; it only wanted to prevent non-Indians from hunting or fishing without a tribal license. Id.
The Court found this argument irrelevant because regulatory power is a component of the power to
exclude. Id. at 2317 n. 1I (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 423-24 (1989)).
124. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 423-24 (opinion of White, J.).
125. Id. at 2318.
126. Id. The Court corrected the court of appeals' reliance on the Cheyenne River Act's purpose of "acquiring the property rights necessary to construct and operate the Oahe Dam and Reservoir." Id. at 2318 (quoting Bourland, 949 F.2d at 993). The Court said 'to focus on purpose is to
misread Montana." Id. The court emphasized that "what is relevant . . . is the effect of the land
alienation occasioned by that policy on Indian treaty rights tied to Indian use and occupation of reservation land." Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 560 n.9).
127. Id.
128. He also drew attention to the fact that the Cheyenne River Act did not destroy the reservation boundaries. Id. at 2321 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J.) The district court found
that conveyance of the taken land to the United States did not diminish the reservation. Id. at 2314.
South Dakota did not appeal this decision. The court of appeals said "it seems clear . . . that the
Cheyenne River Act did not disestablish the boundaries of the reservation." Bourland, 849 F.2d at
990 (citing Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1042 (1984)).
129. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2321 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978)).
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divesture of the Tribe's inherent sovereignty. 3 0 Before analyzing whether
Congress intended to abrogate the Tribe's original sovereign power,
Justice Blackmun renewed his objection to the majority's reliance on a
"suggestion" in Montana that the exercise of tribal power beyond what is
necessary to protect tribal self-government or internal relations.' 3
In Justice Blackmun's view, the majority did not show any evidence
that Congress, by taking the land in question, had implicitly deprived the
Tribe's authority to regulate hunting and fishing.' He emphasized that
the authority relied on by the majority did not endorse this type of reasoning-by-implication. 33 Moreover, Justice Blackmun did not give credence
to the majority's argument that because the Tribe had lost its right to
exclude, it also lost its right to regulate.' Even assuming the Tribe had
lost its power to exclude, Justice Blackmun argued that the Tribe's inherent sovereignty would overcome and authorize tribal regulation of hunting
and fishing. 35
'

130. Id. at 2322 n.2. Colville enumerated examples of an over riding federal interest:
where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding interests
of the National Government, as when the tribes seek to engage in Foreign relations, alienate their lands to non-Indians without federal consent, or prosecute non-Indians in tribal
courts which do not accord the full protection of the Bill of Rights.
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1980).
Later in his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun addressed the inconsistency brought up by
the majority that Congress gave the Army Corps of Engineers authority to promulgate regulations
regarding the taken area. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2323. The Army Corps did not promulgate any
hunting and fishing regulations; instead, it provided that Federal, state and local laws apply on project
lands and waters. Thus, Justice Blackmun argued there was no reason why concurrent jurisdiction
could not exist, as the Tribe was a form of "local" law. Id. at 2324.
131. Id. at 2322 n.2. The majority relied on Montana's statement that "the exercise of tribal power
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with
the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation." Id. at
2319 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564). Justice Blackmun said he already had a chance to state that "this
passage in Montana is contrary to 150 years of Indian-law jurisprudence." Id. at 2322 n.2 (citing Brendale,
492 U.S. at 450-56) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
132. Id.
133. Justice Blackmun did not agree with the majority's reasoning that Congressional intent was
implicit in the fact that Congress deprived the Tribe of its right to exclusive use of the land, that
Congress failed explicitly to reserve to the Tribe the right to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing,
and that Congress gave the Army Corps of Engineers authority to regulate public access to the land.
Id. at 2322. Justice Blackmun said the cases that the majority relied upon to make this assertion stood
for the opposite conclusion. Id. For example, the Court, in Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United
States, would not lightly impute Congressional intent to abrogate or modify hunting and fishing
rights. Menominee, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
134. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2323.
135. Id. This was the second argument posed by Justice Blackmun to reject the majority's belief
that the Tribe's regulatory power was incidental and dependent to its exclusive use of the area. Justice
Blackmun based his first argument on the principle that treaties must be construed so that the Indians
would naturally understand them. Id. (citing Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899)). Justice
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Justice Thomas stated that Justice Blackmun "shuts both eyes to the
reality that after Montana, tribal sovereignty over nonmembers cannot
survive without express congressional delegation."' 36 Is Justice Blackmun
justified in shutting both eyes? Yes. South Dakota v. Bourland continued
the hostile attitude of the Montana and Brendale decisions regarding tribal
regulation of non-Indians by denying the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe the
power to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on land located within
its reservation. Bourland reiterates the reality of Montana and reinforces
37
Justice White's view of tribal regulation enunciated in Brendale.
According to Justice Thomas, the Fort Laramie Treaty established
the Tribe's right to regulate hunting and fishing on its reservation. 3 '
Establishing the treaty-based right to regulate hunting and fishing was
necessary because the majority bluntly stated that tribal power over nonIndians was never inherent.' 39 According to seven justices, tribal sovereignty over nonmembers cannot survive without express congressional
delegation; such is the reality of Montana."4 Bourland makes it clear that
tribal power to regulate non-Indians is very narrow.' 4'
Having decided that Indian tribes have extremely limited sovereignty
over non-Indians, the Court focused on the Tribe's treaty right to regulate
hunting and fishing, and the subsequent legislation that abrogated that right.' 42
The Court found no evidence that Congress intended to allow the Tribe to
assert regulatory jurisdiction over the taken lands pursuant to its inherent
sovereignty. 14 This statement clearly contradicts traditional notions of inherent sovereignty. Inherent tribal sovereignty has never been a product of ConThe majority also iggress because it existed before the United States.'
Blackmun did not believe the Indians anticipated that they would lose their regulatory rights once they
lost the right to exclusive use of the land, Id.
136. Id. at 2320 n.15.

137. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
138. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2316. Conversely, Justice Blackmun pointed out that this treaty only
confirmed the Tribe's already inherent right to regulate hunting and fishing. Id. at 2321 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
139. Id. at2320 n.15.
140. Id.
141. Only three circumstances may justify tribal regulatory authority over non-Indians: express
congressional authority, consensual relationships, and infringement on tribal welfare. See infra notes
180-194 and accompanying text.
142. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2316. Justice Blackmun said the majority had a "myopic focus on
the Treaty." Id. at 2323.
143. Id. at 2319-20.
144. Justice Marshall established that Indians exercised unlimited sovereignty because they had

undisturbed control over their people and territory before the Europeans entered the continent.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
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nored the precedents that endorse the geographic nature of inherent tribal
sovereignty.145
Since the Cheyenne River Act did not destroy the reservation boundaries," 4 the Court should have recognized the Tribe's geographical sovereign authority and allowed tribal regulation. The Court had previously
held that the allotment of lands does not diminish tribal sovereignty. 47 In
addition, the Department of Interior said a tribe has the sovereign power
to determine the conditions upon which persons shall be permitted to
enter its domain, to reside therein, and to do business, whether owned by
the tribe, by members thereof, or by outsiders." 4 The Department's statement comports with the typical territorial-based notions of sovereignty.
For example, if a Colorado resident owns land in Wyoming and seeks to
hunt and fish on that land, she is subject to Wyoming law and regulation.'49 In Bourland, however, the Court without explanation made an

exception to this widely accepted principle when the Tribe attempted to
regulate non-Indian activities. 5 0
Justice Blackmun also emphasized the strength of the Tribe's inherent sovereign powers. Justice Blackmun's dissent pointed out that Con-

145. The majority did not consider the geographical component of tribal sovereignty. The district court found that the Cheyenne River Act did not disestablish the Missouri River boundary of the
Cheyenne River Reservation. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2314. But the majority failed to recognize that
"the Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is a significant geographical component to tribal
sovereignty." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980). See also United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (Indian tribes "are unique aggregations possessing
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.").
In a post Montana case, the Court cited with approval the following statement:
[n]either the United States, nor a state, nor any other sovereignty loses the power to govem the people within its borders by the existence of towns and cities therein endowed with
the usual powers of municipalities, nor by the ownership nor occupancy of the land with
its territorial jurisdiction by citizens or foreigners.
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 143 (1982) (quoting Buster v. Wright 135 F. 947
(8th Cir. 1905) (affirmed tribe's right to tax non-Indians on non-Indian owned fee lands)).
146. See supra note 128. Regardless of what happens to the title of individual lots within the
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation, once Congress sets aside land for an Indian reservation the entire
block retains its reservation status until Congress explicitly indicates otherwise. Solem v. Bartlett, 465
U.S. 463, 470 (1984).
147. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); see also Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481
(1973)
148. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 INTERIOR DEC. 14, 50 (1934).
149. Professor Signer, in criticism of the Brendale decision, noted that landowners who are not
even United States citizens are subject to the zoning laws where their property is located, even though
they cannot participate in any elections. Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1, 34 (1991).
150. Interestingly, under the rationales of Bourland and Brendale, tribal members could withdraw from their tribe and then no longer be subject to tribal regulation (assuming that the tribal member owned the land).
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gress has the power to eradicate inherent tribal sovereignty,'' but until
Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers.1 52 In
addition, the Court has previously found implicit divesture of sovereignty
authority only where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National Government.I5 3 Examples
of overriding interests include instances where tribes seek to engage in
foreign relations,' 54 alienate their lands to non-Indians without federal
consent,' 55 or prosecute non-Indians in tribal courts which do not incorporate the protection of the Bill of Rights." 6 If the majority had applied
these principles, it would have inevitably concluded that the tribe could
have regulated the taken area because no overriding federal interest existed. In fact, the federal interest favored tribal regulation.'57
The Court did not firmly support the current federal Indian policy
The Court anpromoting tribal self-government and self-sufficiency.'
nounced that when Congress reserves limited rights to a tribe,"5 9 this
indicates that the "Indians would otherwise be treated like the public at
large. " 16° By treating the tribe as the public at large, the Court effectively
rejuvenated the assimilation policy that Congress has strongly rejected.' 6 '

151. See supra note 42.
152. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
153. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1980).
154. Oneida Indian Nations v. Oneida County, 414 U.S. 661, 667-68 (1974).
155. Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 547 (1823).
156. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195.
157. The federal government has a "longstanding policy of encouraging tribal self-government."
Iowa Mutuals Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987). Federal Indian policy "includes Congress'
overriding goal of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development." New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 335 (1983); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136, 143 (1980). And, tribal authority over on-reservation conduct must be construed generously in order to comport with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence. Id. at 144.
158. The Court failed to mention the current federal Indian policy of promoting tribal self-government and sufficiency. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334-35 (1983)
(federal government is "firmly committed to the goal of promoting tribal self-government"); KerrMcGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985) (same); California v. Cabazon Band
of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (question of state's ability to regulate reservation gambling
operations must proceed in light of traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and Congress' goal of
Indian self-government, including its overriding goal of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development). One commentator has recently noted the Supreme Court's judicial activism in
Indian law cases. See Skibine, supra note 47, at 806.
159. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
160. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2319.
161. The assimilation policy attempted to make Indians more like whites. Greg Overstreet, ReEmpowering the Native American: A Conservative Proposal to Restore Tribal Sovereignty and SelfReliance to FederalIndian Policy, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 13 (1993) (citing AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE "FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN," 1880-1900 (Francis P.

Prucha ed., 1973)). But the same author advocates that self-determination is an indirect attempt toward assimilation in that self-determination seeks to assimilate the Indians into the American Welfare
State. Id. at 17-18.
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Moreover, Congress anticipated that tribal development of the Oahe
Reservoir would partially offset the detriments to the Tribe.' 62 The Court,
again, failed to uphold the current federal Indian policy of self-government,' 63 while subverting Indian interests for the benefit of non-Indians. 14
Since Congress is responsible for protecting tribal self-government, 165 it should enact legislation to restrain the Court's judicial activism
in the area of tribal sovereignty. 1" Unless Congress focuses the Court's
attention on the importance of tribal sovereignty, the Court will likely
continue to deny tribal regulation over Indian land and resources.167 Be-

The executive branch has also appeared to support tribal sovereignty. Former President
Ronald Regan's official Indian Policy recognized Indian tribes as sovereign political entities. See
Presidents's Statement on Indian Policy, 1983 PUB. PAPERS 96 (Jan. 24, 1983). Former President
George Bush stated that "tribal elected governments and the United States have now established a
unique and special government-to-government relationship . . . we look forward to greater economic
independence and self-sufficiency for Native Americans, and we reaffirm our support for increased
Indian control over tribal government affairs." Proclamation No. 6080 3 C.F.R. §§ 192-93 (1990).
Former President Bush also stated: "the concepts of forced termination and excess dependency on the
Federal Government must now be relegated, once and for all, to the history books [as] we move
forward toward a permanent relationship of understanding and trust." Presidential Statement of Jan.
14, 1991. See also Douglas A. Brockman, Note, CongressionalDelegation of EnvironmentalRegulatory Jurisdiction:Native American Control of the Reservation Environment, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 133, 135 (1992).
162. Senator McFarland, Chairman of the Committee, realized that the Tribe should be able to "build
up a recreational area there that might be valuable." H.R. REP. No. 1047, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1950).
163. See supra note 30. For a discussion of recent legislative action regarding federal Indian
policy, see Nell Jessup Newton, Let a Thousand Policy-flowers Bloom: Making Indian Policy in the
Twenty-First Century, 46 ARK. L. REV. 25 (1993).
164. At one point, many commentators praised the Court for protecting tribal rights. One commentator concluded that the Court's "decisions generally have been principled, even courageous."
WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 2 (1987). More recently, however, many
scholars criticize the Court's performance in Indian cases as confused and inconsistent. See e.g.,
Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal
Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1204 (1990). See also Singer, supra note 149; Karl J. Kramer,
The Most DangerousBranch: An InstitutionalApproach to Understandingthe Role of the Judiciary in
American Indian JurisdictionalDeterminations, 1986 WiS. L. REV. 989 (1986); Robert N. Clinton,
Reservation Specificity and Indian Adjudication:An Essay on the Importance of Limited Contextualism
in Indian Law, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 543, 567-88 (1985); Robert Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back
to Basics, 62 OR. L. REV. 29 (1983).
165. In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall stated that the acts of Georgia "interfere
forcibly with the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the
government of the Union." Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
166. For a discussion on the constitutionality of Congressional action to overturn Supreme
Court decisions, see generally Skibine, supra note 47. New Mexico Representative William B. Richardson has introduced a bill to improve the management of Indian fish and wildlife resources on
Indian lands. INDIAN FISH AND WILDLIFE RESOURCE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 1993, H.R. REP. No.
2874, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). However, Congress still needs to direct a strong statement to the
courts regarding the status of tribal sovereignty.
167. Apparently, Congress' recent affirmation of inherent tribal sovereignty over all Indians on
their reservations did not sufficiently impress the importance of tribal sovereignty upon the Court. 25
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fore the Indian nations can be self-sufficient, they must be given more
control over their land and natural resources. 6 8 The Court's role as an
initial arbiter of federal Indian policy is impractical169 and unwarranted. 7
The majority could have easily distinguished the circumstances in
Montana from those in the instant dispute. In Bourland, the land acquired
by the United States was necessary to construct a dam.' 7 1 It was not acquired in the shadow of Congressional policy that intended to destroy
tribal self-government. The express Congressional policy underlying the
Cheyenne River Act was to limit the impact on the Tribe and to restore
its economic, 72 social, and community relations. 17 The nonmembers
whose conduct the tribe sought to regulate in Bourland are merely transient hunters and fishers who use the land for limited purposes. As such,
they are not fee landowners who desire to use their property as they wish.
In Montana and Brendale, the non-Indian lands were of an entirely different nature because non-Indians, not the United States, held the disputed
land in fee simple pursuant to the Allotment policy."' 4 Because Congress

U.S.C. § 1301(2) (Supp. 11 1990) (amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act in response to Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)). See also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
168. Ross 0. Swimmer, A Blueprintfor Economic Development in Indian Country, 10 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 13, 18 (1989). Professor Pomnersheim has also convincingly argued that tribal sovereignty over its land is necessary to Indian survival. Frank Pomnersheim, The Reservation as Place:
A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D. L. REV. 246 (1989).
169. The Supreme Court is more conservative and more inclined against tribal sovereignty than Congress. Robert Laurence, A Memorandum to the Class, 46 U. ARK. L. REV. 1, 6 (1993). But some argue
that conservative principles should be used to re-empower Indian tribes with the sovereignty they lost via
democratic policies. See generally Overstreet, supra note 161.
Another commentator recently accounted the Supreme Court's unpredictable behavior. Christina D.
Ferguson, Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo: A Modem Day Lesson on Tibal Sovereignty, 46 ARK L. REV.
275 (1993) (noting the that the Supreme Court indulged tribal sovereignty to deny a federal-private cause of
action under the federally enacted Indian Civil Rights Act only two weeks after diminishing it in Oliphant).
170. Non-Indians do not trust tribal governance and they are unwilling to accept tribal governance or regulation over themselves or nonmembers. Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of
Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK L. REV. 77, 141 (1993).
An example of the Court's predisposition is a statement by Justice Reed:
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of
their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by
treaty in return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will
that deprived them of their land.
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955).
171. Admittedly, it also opened the land up to public use. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2317.
172. Deregulation of commercial transactions and restoration of tribal authority is an essential
step toward economic tribal self-determination. Raymond Cross, De-Federalizing American Indian
Commerce: Toward a New PoliticalEconomy for Indian Country, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 445
(1993).
173. Cheyenne River Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 1192.
174. The land subject to dispute in Montana and Brendale had been conveyed in fee to nonIndians pursuant to the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388. In Montana, the court
concluded that "lilt defies common sense to suppose that Congress would intend that non-Indians
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reserved many significant rights to the Tribe in Bourland,'75 the Tribe's
interests clearly dominated the transient interests of non-Indians. Moreover, since hunting and fishing rights are fundamental attributes of Indian
culture, 76 it follows that the Court should protect this interest."v However, the Court is reluctant to guard this cultural ideal when the Tribe does
not have the exclusive right to 79the land it seeks to regulate 7 8 and when
non-Indian rights are involved.1
Current Supreme Court Analysis of Tribal Regulatory-Jurisdiction over

non-Indian lands and activities within the reservation
After Bourland, the decision as to whether a tribe may regulate nonIndian lands and resources located within the reservation follows two
steps. First, the Court determines whether Congress has expressly granted
the tribe regulatory authority over non-Indians by treaty or statute. 18° If
this authority exists, the Court will next decide whether the tribe has lost
this right. t8 '
purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed purpose of the
allotment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal government." Montana, 450 U.S. at 560 n.9.
175. Bourand, 113 S.Ct. at 2314.
176. The district court found that subsistence hunting and fishing is an important cultural, social, and religious activity of the tribe. Respondents' Brief at 6, Bourland (No. 91-2051); Joint Appendix at 67. The "fundamental sovereign power of local governments to control land use is especially vital to Indians, who enjoy a unique historical and cultural connection to the land." Brendale, 492
U.S. at 458 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960)
(Black, J., dissenting)).
An illustrative example of the this cultural interest includes a statement by a Western Cherokee who testified during a Congressional hearing regarding the Tellico Dam, which would flood the
Cherokees' spiritual homeland:
In the language of my people ... there is a word for land: Eloheh. This same word also
means history, culture, and religion. We cannot separate our place on earth from our lives
on the earth nor from our vision nor from our meaning as a people. We are taught from
childhood that the animals and even the trees and plants that we share a place with are our
brothers and sister. So when we speak of land, we are not speaking of property, territory,
or even a piece of ground upon which our houses sit and our crops are grown. We are
speaking of something truly sacred.
Meyers, supra note 40 at 80 (1991) (citing PETER MArrHESSEN, INDIAN COUNTRY 119 (1984)).
177. The cultural diversity and traditional practices of the indigenous peoples could allow them
to play a significant role in environmental management. Russel L. Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 277 (1993). The "Earth Summit" directed world
governments to develop procedures for involving indigenous peoples in all important decisions. 1
Reports of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.
151126/Rev.l, ch. 26, at 385-88 (1992).
178. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2316-17.
179. Professor Frickey recognized "that the Court in the modem era remains able to apply Chief
Justice Marshall's basic approach, at least for disputes in which there is no significant non-Indian interest at
stake." Frickey, supra note 28, at 22 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976)).
180. For example, the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act expressly give tribes jurisdiction
over all reservation lands. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1377(e) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (1988).
181. After Bourland, a tribe may lose a regulatory right by express, implied or even silent
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Second, if Congress has not expressly given a tribe the authority to
regulate non-Indian activity, or if it has abrogated the tribal right, the
Court makes a particularized inquiry. Bourland retained Montana's "other
potential sources"" of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians."t Hence,
Tribes may still regulate non-Indians who enter consensual relations with
the tribe through contracts, leases or other commercial dealings." s And,
the tribe may still assert regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian activities
that threaten or directly affect the tribe's political integrity, economic
security or health and welfare. s
In Bourland, the Court did not find an opportunity to explain these
"other sources" of tribal authority." Non-Indians had not entered a
consensual relationship with the tribe, and the district court did not find
any evidence that the Tribe's welfare was in jeopardy." s The Court did
not expound on the circumstances necessary to threaten or directly affect
a tribe so that it could legitimately regulate non-Indian activities. Thus,
Justice White's narrow interpretation of the tribal welfare exception in
Brendale may influence the outcome of future disputes."'8 Under his view,
jurisdiction over non-Indian activities will not necessarily be available

Congressional abrogation. In this respect, the Bourland majority merely gave lip service to the statutory canons of construction regarding Indian statutes and treaties. The majority said it "usually"
insists that Congress clearly express its intent to abrogate Indians' treaty rights. Bourland, 113 S.Ct.
at 2315-16 (citing Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986)). The Court retreated from or misapplied these precedents with no explanation.
In the Flood Control Act and Cheyenne River Act, Congress neither mentioned whether the tribe
retained its power to regulate hunting and fishing nor did it even consider the matter. Unfortunately, the
Court treated this silence with undue merit. Prior Supreme Court precedents reject silence as a means to
absolve tribal powers. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the Court refused to find that the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe waived its taxing power because a lease was silent on the matter. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). The Merrion Court did not defer to the silence because it would "[tum] the
concept of sovereignty on its head." Id. at 148. Moreover, the tribe could enforce its severance tax because
Congress had not divested this power by express or silent means. Id. at 149. Similarly, the Court has an
obligation to "trend lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent." Id. at 149 (quoting Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978)).
182. Presumably, to draw attention away from the Tribe's inherent sovereignty, the Bourland
Court called Montana's tribal welfare and consensual relationship exceptions "other potential sources
of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians." Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2320.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. Although the court of appeals directed the district court to conduct a Montana exceptions-analysis regarding the 18,000 acres of fee land taken from non-Indians, it did not pass upon the
district court's previous findings regarding the entire taken area. Bourland, 949 F.2d at 995. The
Supreme Court left this issue to be resolved on remand. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2320.
188. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
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where a significant tribal interest is threatened; it will depend on the
circumstances.1'
The Court will also continue to analyze the nature and character of the
land in determining whether a tribe may regulate non-Indians. Justice Thomas
noted that the taken area was not a "closed" or pristine area, but he did not
indicate how to distinguish between "open" and "closed" portions of a reservation."9 His opinion does show, however, that the Court favors the nonIndian interest. When non-Indian interests are prominent, a tribe will infrequently have regulatory jurisdiction over the lands and natural resources
located within its reservation. The Court effectively forces Indian tribes to
maintain their "closed" or pristine areas to avoid losing regulatory authority.
This is an unfair restraint on a tribe's right to develop its land."' t
Similarly, a tribe's ability to regulate non-Indian lands and resources
within its reservation will depend heavily on the effect of any land alienation.
According to the majority, the proper focus is on the effect of the land alienation, not the congressional purpose." If a tribe has lost its right to exclude
non-Indians, the Court will likely find that it has also impliedly lost the right
to regulate the non-Indian activity.' 93 Although non-Indians had not heavily
settled the taken lands pursuant to the Allotment policy in Bourland, the
94
effect of broadly opening the area to public use precluded tribal regulation.'

189. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 429. Justice White argued that tribal zoning pursuant to Montana's
tribal welfare exception would "make little sense" because zoning authority would only last as long as
the Tribe's welfare was in jeopardy. Id. at 429-30. Thus, if the threat ended, zoning authority would
revert back to the state. Id. at 430.
190. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2317 n.9. Under Brendale, a tribe may be able to maintain and
regulate reservation lands where only a small proportion of the closed area is owned in fee. Brendale,
492 U.S. at 441. However, Bourland may affect this analysis. Although the majority felt that the
nature of the governments tide in the taken land was irrelevant to the disposition of the case, it assumed that the government's title was in fee. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2314 n.4. The government's
interest in the "taken" land is far from being fee simple because Congress reserved considerable
rights to the Tribe. Id. at 2314. To hold property in fee simple the owner must possess all the sticks
of a bundle. See generally, THOMAS BERGIN AND PAUL HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND

AND FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1984); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 615 (6th ed. 1990). If anything,

the Court should have concluded that the United States still held the land in trust, for the benefit of
the tribe. Moreover, the Cheyenne River Act did not destroy the Cheyenne Sioux reservation boundaries. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2314.
191. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 465 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (Justice Blaekmun posed that Justice
Steven's opinion was patronizing to Indians and reservation life).
192. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2318. Conversely, Justice Blackmun argued that the proper question is the Congressional purpose of the alienation. Id. at 2323 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 2316-17 (noting that Montana and Brendale established this principle). In 1982, the
Court specifically rejected the power-to-exclude theory. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
145, 143-44 (1982) ("Tribe's authority to tax derives not from its power to exclude but from its
power to govern and to raise revenues to pay for the costs of government").
194. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2318.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1994

27

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 29 [1994], Iss. 2, Art. 6

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXIX

CONCLUSION
In South Dakota v. Bourland, the United States Supreme Court
maintained an ambivalent view of inherent tribal authority and Indian
interests.' 95 It frustrated current congressional Indian policy and violated
well-established principles of federal Indian law. The Court offered more
than a reaffirmation of Montana and Brendale. Land the federal government holds for the benefit of the tribe and the general public will be
subject to state, county, or otherwise non-Indian regulation, even if the
tribe retains substantial rights in the land.
After'Bourland, the tribal interest is clearly secondary to the nonIndian interest. In Bourland, the tribe had a greater interest in the taken
land than non-Indians, nevertheless the Court denied tribal regulation of
hunting and fishing. Bourland retained the Montana exceptions, and a
majority of the Court decided to follow Justice White's narrow interpretation of those exceptions in Brendale. Moreover, the Court focused on the
extent to which the reservation lands were open to non-Indians. Therefore, Indian tribes must know that the more open their lands are to nonIndians, 96
the less likely they will be able to regulate those lands and resources. 1

While the relationship between the United States and the Indian
tribes is admittedly complex, Bourland illustrates that the Court resolves
the problem to the detriment of the tribes. The solution lies with Congress, which must, once again, enact legislation to remedy the Court's
departure from well-established principles of federal Indian law. Until
Congress takes action, the Court will continue to erode Chief Justice
Marshall's original vision of tribal sovereignty."

JOHN H. MCCLANAHAN

195. Popular culture has recently recognized "the continuance of the U.S. genocidal policy
that's been perpetrated against the native peoples of this country." Daina Darzin, Rage take on the
rights of Native Americans: Machine Dreams, ROLLING STONE, March 10, 1994, at 19 (quoting Rage
Against the Machine musician De la Rocha who was referring to the controversial prosecution of
Leonard Peltier for the deaths of two federal agents).
196. Proposed development of the Wind River Indian Reservation will make Bourland an important consideration for Wyoming Indians. See, e.g., Norma Williamson, BIA tours Wind River
Indian Reservation Tourism, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, March 21, 1994, at B1. See also Walter E.
Stem, Environmental Compliance Considerationsfor Developers of Indian Lands, 28 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 79 (1993).
197. Although striking and somewhat overwhelming, the suggestion of eliminating Supreme
Court jurisdiction over Indian cases becomes even more persuasive after South Dakota v. Bourland.
See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm and Michael Cadigan, The Indian Court of Appeals: A Modest Proposal
to Eliminate Supreme Court Jurisdictionover Indian Cases, 46 ARK L. REV. 203 (1993).
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